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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a model in which a firm conducts non-linear pricing though bundling. 
However some agents, ‘unbundlers’, find it profitable to unbundle output. Unbundlers have 
an increasing marginal cost of unbundling, which limits the extent of unbundling. Customers 
with identical demand can purchase either bundled or unbundled output. In equilibrium, some 
consumers purchase bundled output and others unbundled output. The analysis shows how 
the extent of unbundling and the optimal bundle size are related to the cost of unbundling. 
Failing to account for presence of unbundling could lead to a misinterpretation of market 
efficiency.  
 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Bob Hammond and David Prentice for their comments on an earlier draft. All errors 
remain my responsibility. 
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Non-linear pricing with homogeneous customers  
and limited unbundling 
 
Many goods are bundled when supplied.  Bundling is profitable for suppliers, because it 
enables them to conduct non-linear pricing. When analysing the impact of such bundling, the 
economic literature almost universally assumes that once the good is bundled it cannot be, at 
some later time, unbundled and resold. 1 This paper presents a model in which some agents, 
‘unbundlers’, find it profitable to unbundle output which is initially sold using non-linear 
pricing. Limited unbundling is present in the equilibrium of this model. Limited unbundling 
occurs when a fraction of the bundles sold are unbundled are the unbundled output resold.  
The extent of unbundling is limited because unbundlers have an increasing marginal cost of 
unbundling. 
 
Many bundled goods are not inherently unable to be unbundled and resold. For example 
individual confectionaries are often bundled into larger packages. Bundling (or packaging in 
this example) can act to prevent resale. To sell individual confectionaries it is necessary to 
remove them from their packaging, which would involve some cost, and hence discourage 
unbundling.  It is often observed that manufacturers attempt to discourage unbundling, for 
instance by making bundles unnecessarily difficult (hence costly) to unpack, or by including 
statements such as ‘not for sale separately’ on the individual confectionary packaging. (Such 
statements, by themselves, do not have the force of law on customers, but might be 
considered a discouragement to unbundling.) Alternatively manufacturers might enter into 
contractual arrangements that the goods were not to be unbundled, and then threaten legal 
actions against anyone who attempted to unbundle output. 
 
Unbundling may also be unintentionally discouraged by various pieces of legislation. For 
instance legislation might requires that consumer information be included on each item sold.2 
                                                 
1 The one exception I am aware of is Alger (1999) and McManus (2002), which are discussed below. 
2 In the US labelling requirements for food packages are governed by Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. See: 
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Confectionary manufacturers can therefore discourage resale by including the required 
information on the bundle’s packaging, but on individual wrappers. In addition food and 
safety laws can make it costly to unpackaged and then ‘cut down’ large blocks of chocolate 
into smaller blocks of chocolate. 3 However, there is not always this type of unintended 
legislative impediments to the unbundling of goods: for instance there would appear to be no 
equivalent legislative impediment to the unbundling of clothing bundles (e.g. socks). 
 
Where unbundling breaches a law (or even when it is likely to simply aggravate the 
manufacturer), resale markets are necessarily informal. As such, evidence of such activity 
tends to be anecdotal. 4 Nonetheless some readers may have experienced some form of this 
behaviour. For instance, a vendor at a street market might sell unbundled confectionary. 
Alternatively, consumers may form coalitions which act as unbundlers. For example, a work 
place may have a convention in which employees take turns to purchase a large packet of 
confectionary, rather than each employee purchasing a separate confectionary. In effect, the 
employee who purchases the packet of confectionary acts as an ‘unbundler’, albeit in a barter 
market.  
 
The model presented in this paper is designed to explore the implications of these 
considerations for the implementation of non-linear prices. It is assumed all customers have 
identical demand. A monopolist (who could be thought of as a manufacturer) bundles their 
output. Customers are able to purchase this bundle from the firm at a ‘block’ price. However 
customers are also able to purchase unbundled units of output from unbundlers: these are 
firms or individuals (such as the confectionary purchasing employees discussed above) which 
operate to unbundle output.  Unbundlers have an increasing marginal cost of unbundling, 
which limits the extent of unbundling. Intuitively, one might think that in some workplaces 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuidanceRegulatoryInformation/default.htm 
In Australia, Canada and the European Union  nutrition facts label has to be placed on packages containing 
food. 
3 Where components of the bundle do not have their own packaging health and safety regulations may 
discourage resale. For instance breakfast cereal is usually packaged, but could, in principle, be unpacked and 
sold on a per unit basis.  However, to comply with health and safety standards, this would require (costly) 
imposition of hygiene standards.  
4 For instance the following internet exchange: http://forums.macnn.com/89/macnn-lounge/239428/what-does-
not-resale-mean-individually/ discusses a shop which we selling small candy bars marked “not for resale”. 
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the opportunity cost of sharing packets of confectionaries is relatively low and in others it is 
relatively high. In equilibrium, a subset of consumers purchase bundled output and the 
remaining consumers purchase unbundled output.  
 
The analysis shows that resale inhibits the use of non-linear prices. 5 Customers receive 
consumer surplus and firm profit is lower than when unbundling is impossible. The analysis 
shows how, in the presence of unbundling, the extent of unbundling and the optimal bundle 
size are related to the cost of unbundling. The impacts of legislation and manufacturers 
activities to discourage unbundling are analysed.  The impact on efficiency of the presence of 
unbundling activities is analysed.  
 
The discussion of non-linear pricing (in which firm does not use a linear (per unit) price to 
sell to a given customer) in the literature is usually conducted in conjunction with price 
discrimination (in which the firms sets different prices to different customers).6  Apart from 
the papers discussed below, it is assumed by authors that unbundling and resale are 
impossible.7  When unbundling and resale are indeed impossible, and when customers are 
identical (as assumed in this paper), firms can conduct first degree price discrimination either 
(i) by using a two part tariff with the per unit charge equal to marginal cost and an access 
price equal to the consumer surplus or (ii) by bundling the efficient level of output and 
charging a fee equal to total consumer benefit. It is often noted (though not formally 
modelled) that the use of a two part tariff is undermined if costless resale if possible. Under a 
two part tariff a customer can drive the average price of a unit of output to marginal cost if 
they make a sufficiently large purchase.8 This customer can profit by reselling to other 
customers using linear pricing with some mark-up over marginal cost. These discussions 
leave the impression, though this is not explicitly stated, that bundling output (i.e. using block 
                                                 
5 Hammond shows, in the context of a general equilibrium model with a continuum of agents that costless 
trading imposes a restriction on firms: namely they must use linear pricing.  
6 Maskin and Riley (1984) develop a model of price discrimination with non-linear pricing. 
7 However the discussion of resale is often perfunctory, aimed merely at establishing that resale is impossible, or 
unlikely, for a class of goods. Thus the literature has implicitly assumed that resale is either costless or infinitely 
costly. The implications of resale are not explored, either for price discrimination or non-linear pricing. Wilson 
(1993) pp. 11-12 however provides a thoughtful discussion of the impact of resale on the use of non-linear 
prices.  However all of his examples involve price discrimination.  
8 See for example Carlton and Perloff (2005 p. 294). McManus (1998) discusses optimal consumer strategies in 
the presence of heterogeneous demand.   
 4
pricing) firms could overcome this problem. However the above examples indicate that this 
would not be the case if some customers can unbundle output at a modest cost.  Thus the 
analysis in this paper also provides an explanation of how resale (unbundling in this case) 
limits the use of block pricing. 9  
 
Surprisingly relatively little attention has been given to unbundling or resale in the literature. 
And these papers consider unbundling in the presence of both nonlinear pricing and price 
discrimination. The closest paper to this one is Alger (1999). Alger assumes each of the two 
customer types can make within-type collations (joint purchases which enable unbundling) 
and (unlike this paper) face zero transaction costs when making and dividing up joint 
purchases. However, because incentive compatibility constraints always hold in Alger’s 
model, no collations are present, and hence no unbundling occurs, in equilibrium. Alger 
shows that including the possibility of customers making joint purchases ensures each 
consumer type has strictly positive utility, the quantity in both type’s bundle are downwardly 
distorted and firm profit is lower. The admittance of joint purchases in this model has an 
ambiguous effect on welfare, though Alger argues that it tends to lower welfare. 10  
 
McManus (2002) considers the impact of coalition formation a firm that utilises two part 
tariffs.  Coalition size and composition is exogenous in these models. McManus assumes 
there is a transaction cost to the formation of coalitions. He finds that collation formation may 
improve firm profitability.  In McManus’s model when consumers are able to form collations 
the monopolist can set the fixed fee equal to the sum of the surpluses of coalition members. 
However when consumers can’t form coalitions, the fee cannot exceed the surplus of the low 
demand type. 
 
Gans and King (2007) consider whether costless consumer arbitrage necessarily undermines 
the use of perfect price discrimination. They present a model in which the firm may utilise 
                                                 
9  The durable goods literature, drawing on Coase (1972), also considers the possibility of resale. This literature 
differs from this paper by (i) assuming either a linear price and/or unit demand and (ii) customer heterogeneity. 
See Waldman (2003) for a survey. 
10 Alger could not find a numerical model in which the admission of joint purchases raises welfare (1999 p. 
751).  
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perfect price discrimination even when consumer arbitrage is possible. Their model’s 
assumptions differ from the present one in that (i) consumers are of two types, (ii) each 
customer has only one unit of demand and (iii) the firm is uncertain as to the proportion of 
customers are of a given type. As these assumptions suggest, their model (like those of Alger 
and McManus) is designed to investigate the impact of consumer arbitrage on price 
discrimination rather than specifically on non-linear pricing. 
 
Resale of a monopolist’s output has been considered in different contexts. Aguirre and Paz 
Espinosa (2004) consider the impact of consumer arbitrage in a linear city model with convex 
transportation cost. Consumer arbitrage may lower total transportation costs, and thereby 
reduce variety in equilibrium. Aguirre and Espinosa’s model, unlike that in this paper, utilises 
linear pricing (as is normal for linear city models). Calzolari and Pavan (2006) consider 
pricing mechanism for a monopolist who sells a durable good which can be resold in a 
secondary market. This paper considers only goods which can be used once, thus there does 
not exist a secondary market for the goods.  
 
The paper proceeds in the following way. In the following section the model is introduced, 
and the profit maximising bundle size and fee are determined. In section 3 the implications of 
a change in the cost of unbundling is considered. In sections 2 and 3 it is assumed the 
unbundling cost is exogenous. In section 4 the model is extended to allow the firm to 
undertake costly activities which deter unbundling. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
1. A model of non-linear pricing with unbundling 
 
A monopolist producer sells output which is infinitely divisible. This firm sells output in L 
bundles with Z units per bundle. There are N final customers who have common benefit 
function, B(X), and thus common demand function P(X)≡B′(X), where X is the quantity 
consumed by the customer and P′(X)<0. Each of these identical consumers receives the 
benefit B(Z) from consuming this bundle. The producer charges a fee (or block price), T, for 
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the bundle. Define the linear component of this fee to be P(Z)Z and the non linear component 
of the fee, R, by R≡T-P(Z)Z. 
 
Final customers purchase output from retailers. There are two types of retailers. One type, 
distributors, faces an infinite cost of unbundling output. The second type, unbundlers,  have a 
total cost  from unbundling activity G(M), where M is the number of bundles that are 
unbundled by these firms. Assume G′(M)>0 and G″(M)>0. There is assumed to be a given 
number of unbundlers. 11 All retailers have zero cost of distribution and the retail market is 
contestable.   Final customers may purchase either bundled or unbundled output.  Distributors 
sell bundles to final customers for the same price they were purchased from the monopolist 
and earn a zero profit. 
 
There is assumed to be a competitive market for the unbundled output supplied by 
unbundlers. The producer cannot identify which retailers are unbundlers, so cannot exclude 
unbundlers from purchasing its output.12  Under the above assumptions unbundled units 
would trade for a price: 
 
P(Y) = [T+g(M)]/Z = R/Z +P(Z) + g(M)/Z     (1) 
 
where g(M)≡G′(M) is the cost of unbundling the marginal bundle. Call Y the unbundled 
quantity. It represents the amount of output a customer purchases, at the linear price of P(Y), 
if they choose to purchase unbundled output. 
 
The above model could be given an alternative interpretation. Suppose that, instead of output 
being distributed by retailers, customers purchase bundled output directly from the producer.  
Unbundlers are interpreted as those customers, or groups of customers, who unbundle output 
                                                 
11 This assumption can be weaken, without changing the qualitative results in this paper, so that  the number of 
unbundlers increases with the price of unbundled output. For simplicity, this extension of the analysis is not 
included. 
12  This also means the producer cannot implement a two part tariff. 
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purchased from the producer to share amongst themselves or other customers. Equation (1) 
then represents the level of unbundling activity of this group of customers. Final customer 
then either consume bundled output purchased directly from retailers or unbundled output 
obtained through unbundlers. This interpretation does not alter the mathematical statement of 
the above model, but allows it to be applied to those examples considered by Alger (1999).  
 
In equilibrium final customers must be indifferent between purchasing bundled and 
unbundled output. Thus  
 
B(Z) – (R +P(Z)Z) = B(Y) – YP(Y) ≥ 0       (2) 
 
By the implicit function theorem equation (2) implies R=R(Z,Y) and thus (1) implies that 
M=M(Z,Y). The producer’s profit is given by: 
 
π(Z,Y) = L(Z,Y)Π(Z,Y)-F =  ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞N-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z-Y
Y M(Z,Y) (R(Z,Y) +P(Z)Z-cZ) - F  (3) 
 
where L(Z,Y) is the number of bundles sold by the producer, Π(Z,Y) is the profit per bundle, 
F is the fixed cost and c is the constant marginal cost.13 It is assumed that (in order to satisfy 
the second order conditions) that the benefit function is such that πZZ(Z,Y)<0 and 
πYY(Z,Y)<0. The number of bundles sold is calculated by noting that each unbundled bundle 
supplies Z/Y customers. Thus the producer does not sell directly to ZM/Y customers. It does, 
however, sell M bundle to unbundlers. Thus the number of bundles sold is N- ZM/Y+M.  The 
profit per bundle is made up of (P(Z)-c)Z, which called the linear component of profit per 
bundle and R the non-linear component of profit per bundle. The firm maximises its profit, 
π(Z,Y), subject to (2). In this event: 
                                                 
13 Constant marginal cost is assumed for analytic convenience. However results are not qualitatively affected by 
assuming a more general form of cost. 
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Proposition 1: In equilibrium Z>Y. The firm chooses output per bundle according to:  
P(Z)-c = (Π/L){M/Y+(Z-Y)MZ/Y} > 0     (4) 
where  MZ>0. The unbundled quantity is chosen according to: 
P(Y)
ε(Y) =  (Π/L)[ZM/Y
2-(Z-Y)MY/Y] > 0     (5) 
 where MY< 0 and where ε(Y)≡-P(Y)/YP′(Y) is the elasticity of demand. 
The proof of proposition 1 is given in the appendix. This proof also contains expressions for 
MZ and MY. Condition (4) indicates that P(Z)>c, and hence the size of the bundle sold by the 
firm is less than the efficient level. Intuitively, as in the case without unbundling, increasing 
the size of the bundle, Z, increases profit per bundle by P(Z)-c. However in the presence of 
unbundling, increasing the size of the bundle has two additional effects that are represented 
by the two terms on the RHS of (4). The first term on the RHS of (4) indicates that an 
increase in Z reduces the number of bundles need to supply a given level of unbundled 
output. Hence this effect increases the incentive to unbundle output. The second term on the 
RHS of (4) represents the effect that an increase in Z increases has on the benefit of 
unbundling, i.e. the RHS of (1). An increase in Z lowers increases the gap between P(Y) and 
P(Z) and increases the non-linear component. Thus there is an increases unbundling. Both 
effects on the RHS of (4) are positive. Hence the equilibrium bundle size is less than the 
efficient level of output.  
 
Condition (5) identifies the profit maximising level of the unbundled output. The LHS of (5) 
represents the cost to the firm of raising Y. An increase in Y causes the price of unbundled 
output, P(Y), falls.  Lowering the price of unbundled output (while maintaining Z) means 
that, by (2), the firm must lower the non-linear component, R. The RHS of (5) represents the 
benefit to the firm of increasing Y. An increase in Y means more bundles must be unbundled 
to supply a given number of customers, thus increasing the cost of unbundling. This effect is 
captured by the first term on the RHS of (5).  By (1), an increase in Y lowers the price of 
unbundled output and reduces the non-linear component. There is thus less incentive to 
unbundle output as Y increases. Both effects on the RHS of (5) indicate that as Y increases 
the extent of unbundling reduces.  These two effects raise total profit. The equilibrium value 
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of Y occurs when the marginal cost of increasing Y (the LHS of (5)) is equal to the marginal 
benefit of increasing Y.  
 
The equilibrium bundle satisfies both (4) and (5). Having determined the equilibrium values 
of Z and Y, (2) can be rearranged to give an expression for the share of profit per bundle due 
to the non-linear component. As proposition 1 shows Z>Y then: 
 
 Corollary 1: 0 < R < B(Z) – P(Z)Z 
 
Corollary 1 shows that the firm always enacts a non-linear component, but leaves customers 
with a non-zero consumer surplus. Thus, by (4), those customers who purchase bundles 
receive a smaller than optimal bundle, but by corollary 1 they also receive some consumer 
surplus. Those customers who purchase unbundled output acquire a smaller output than that 
in the bundle, but receive the same consumer surplus as provided by the bundle. Thus the 
presence of unbundling benefits consumers at the expense of both the firm’s profit and 
efficiency. 
 
The presence of unbundling lowers profits. It might be thought that the firm could thwart the 
unbundlers by (i) also selling output at the linear price P(Y) or (ii) lowering R infinitesimally 
to attempt to make the bundled output preferable to customers. However, because the 
marginal cost of unbundling is rising, this action would only ‘crowd out’ the marginal 
unbundler (or marginal bundle). All others unbundlers would strictly prefer to unbundle; in 
effect the price of unbundled output would drop marginally. The firm could attempt to reduce 
unbundling further by lowering the linear price of unbundled output. However, by (2), this 
would entail reducing the non-linear component of the fee, and would thus be unprofitable.  
 
Note that the above argument is predicated on the assumption that the marginal cost of 
unbundling is strictly increasing (i.e. g′(M)>0). If the marginal cost of unbundling was 
constant (i.e. g(M) a constant), then P(Y) would represent the minimum price any unbundler 
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would trade at. In such a case the firm could exclude unbundlers by ensuring that the bundle 
provided infinitesimally more consumer surplus than unbundled output could provide. 
 
Now consider the efficient bundle size, assuming that it is not possible for a social planner to 
influence the level of unbundling. In this event, constraints (1) and (2) must both hold. The 
surplus is given by: 
 
S = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞N-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z
Y M(Z,Y) (B(Z)-cZ) + ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z
Y M(Z,Y)(B(Y)-cY)-G(M)-F   (6) 
 
It is readily seen that the efficient outcome is guaranteed by a linear price equal to marginal 
cost. In this case Y=Z=XE and R=0, where XE is the efficient output level.  
However suppose F>0, and it is also required that profit is non-negative. In this case the 
following constraint must also hold: 
 
L(Z,Y)Π(Z,Y) ≥ F       (7) 
 
The constrained efficient bundle maximises (6) subject to (7). A set of simultaneous 
equations describing the efficient bundle is provided in the appendix. The following is also 
shown: 
Proposition 2:  The constrained efficient output per bundle is greater than the 
equilibrium output per bundle, and the constrained efficient unbundled quantity is 
greater than the equilibrium output per bundle. 
 
Suppose the firm is producing the equilibrium bundle. If it increases Z by a small amount 
(while maintaining Y), its profit falls only infinitesimally (i.e. the fall in profit is second order 
effect). This is because the gain in profit from existing customers from the increase in bundle 
 11
size is just outweighed by the fall in profit due to the loss of customers to unbundlers. 
However the net benefit to those customers who switch to unbundled output is included in the 
calculation of the surplus, but not in the calculation of profit.  Hence the marginal profit from 
an increase in bundle size is less than the marginal surplus. Consequently the firm has an 
incentive to provide an inefficiently small bundle. 
 
Suppose again that the firm is producing the equilibrium bundle, and then it increases Y by a 
small amount (while maintaining Z). The fall in profit from the resultant fall in the non-linear 
component to existing customers is just offset by increase in profit from the reduction in 
unbundling.  In addition, the increase in Y reduces the deadweight loss from those customers 
who purchase unbundled output.  This effect increases the surplus, but does not affect firm 
profit. Hence the marginal profit from an increase in Y is less than the marginal surplus. 
Consequently the firm has an incentive to choose an inefficiently small Y. Consequently, by 
(2), consumer surplus is also inefficiently small 
 
2. Changes to the cost of unbundling 
 
The cost of unbundling could be influence by either the intentional or unintentional 
consequences of legislation. It is thus of interest to understand how the cost of unbundling 
affects the equilibrium described by proposition 1. To this end, it is useful to assume that 
g(M)=αM, where α represents the rate of increase of the cost of unbundling. The following 
proposition identifies two important ‘extreme’ special cases, and indicates how the 
monopolist’s profits are influenced by changes in the cost of unbundling. 
Proposition 3: Suppose that g(M)=αM. Then:  
(a) as α→0, (i) Z→XM, (ii)Y→XM, (iii) R→0 and (iv) L→N where XM is the 
linear pricing monopolist’s output.  
(b) as α→∞, (i) Z→XE, (ii)  Y→0 (iii) R→B(XE)-cXE and (iv) L→N where 
XE is the efficient output level.  
(c)  increases in α increases profit. 
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In the case in which α =0 the firm is indifferent between linear and non-linear pricing. 
Specifically the firm is indifferent between selling each unit at the linear price P(XM) and 
selling XM units for a fee of P(XM)XM. Proposition 3(a) parallels Hammond (1987).  
Hammond considers a continuum economy in which goods are costlessly exchangeable. In 
general equilibrium goods must be sold at linear prices: the exchangeability undermines non-
linear pricing. Proposition 3(a) is a similar result in a polar opposite setting: there is only one 
customer type (rather than a continuum) and a partial equilibrium (rather than general 
equilibrium) is modelled.   
 
In the case in which α→∞ the monopolist can act as a first degree price discriminator. Thus 
proposition 3(a) and 2(b) show that the linear pricing monopoly (costless resale) and first 
degree price discriminator (infinitely costly resale) are nested in the model. In both cases the 
monopolist sells its output to all customers. Proposition 3(c) shows that the monopolist 
benefits from an increase in the cost of unbundling. An increase in α reduces the incentive of 
unbundlers to conduct resale, thus increasing the scope for the firm to extract consumer 
surplus from customers. 
 
The most instructive method to further analyse the impact of a change in α on the equilibrium 
of the model is to consider an illustrative numerical example.14 One such numerical example 
is now presented.  In this numerical example it is assumed that the inverse demand function is 
linear, and specified by P(X) = 10 – X.  Marginal cost is given by c=2 and fixed cost is zero. 
It is assumed there are 100 customers (i.e., N=100).  With this specification a linear pricing 
monopoly would produce XM=4 units per customer for a price of 6, thus generating a profit 
of 16. The linear pricing monopolist would cause a deadweight loss of 8 per customer and a 
benefit of 32 per customer (8 of which is consumer surplus). A first degree price 
discriminator would sell XE=8 units per customer, and generate a profit of 32 per customer.  
The price of the bundle from the first degree price discriminator is thus 48, which equates to 
an average price of 6 per unit (which is the same as the linear pricing monopolist). 
 
                                                 
14 Undertaking a comparative static analysis is not particularly illuminating, due to the multiplicity of effects 
that are present when there is a change to the cost of unbundling. Both Alger (1999) and McManus (2002) also 
find it useful to analyse their models using numerical examples.  
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Table 1 shows numerical solutions of the model with varying values of α. In this example the 
size of the bundle (Z) increases monotonically from the level produced by the linear pricing 
monopoly, 4, to the efficient level, 8, as α is increased. The value of Y decreases 
monotonically from the linear pricing level towards zero as α is increased. Consequently the 
resale price of output, P(Y),  increases monotonically from the linear pricing level, 6, to the 
choke price, P(0)=10. Similarly the nonlinear component, R, rises monotonically from 0 to 
B(XE)-cXE=32. These results suggest that there is a monotonic transition from the linear 
pricing bundle to the first degree price discriminating bundle as α increases.  
 
However, while these properties of the bundle are monotonic with respect to α, this is not the 
case for unbundled output. Note that there is an initial rise in the number of bundles that are 
unbundled, then this declines to zero as α increases. This is because there are two effects on 
M as a result of an increase in α: (i) an increase in α raises the price of unbundled output and 
hence encourages unbundling, but (ii) increases the marginal cost of unbundling and hence 
discourages unbundling. M increases when the first effect dominates and declines when the 
second effect dominates.  
 
Note that for very low values of α, about 30 of the 100 bundles sold are unbundled. This 
figure is relatively high because, even for low α, the firm has a strong incentive to enact non-
linear pricing rather than linear pricing: profit increases with the square of increases in Z. 
Because the marginal cost of unbundling is low, there is considerable scope for significant 
unbundling activity.  
 
The number of bundles sold by the firm, L, is also non-monotonic in α. The firm sells 100 
bundles for very low and very high values of α. However, as α increases from zero N 
declines, reaches a minimum (in the reported values) of α=1, then increases as α increases. 
This is because the number of bundles sold is inversely related to the number of customers 
purchasing unbundled output. As α increases beyond 10-6 the number of bundles that are sold 
to unbundlers and unbundled declines. However the quantity purchased by customers 
consuming unbundled output also declines. The effect on L of an increase in α depends on 
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which of these effects dominates. For high values of α L≈100, and the firm sells virtually all 
of these bundles directly to customers rather than unbundlers. 
 
Table 1 also reports the value of T/Z, the average price per unit in a bundle.  As noted above 
T/Z has a value of 6 for α=0 and α=∞. However table 1 shows that T/Z has a higher value for 
intermediate values of α, with T/Z having a maximum  (in the reported values) of α=1. This 
pattern is the result of two effects:  the average non linear component, R/Z, increases with α, 
however P(Z) declines with α. For low values of α R rises rapidly with α, hence this effect 
dominates. 
 
The deadweight loss (DWL), and the DWL as a percentage of maximum surplus (D/B),  are 
reported in table 1 for various values of α. DWL arises in two ways: the DWL associated 
with customers who purchase bundles is B(XE)-cXE-[B(Z)-cZ], and the DWL associated with 
customers  who purchase unbundled output is B(XE)-cXE-[B(Y)-cY]. Unsurprising the DWL 
is less than that associated with a linear pricing monopoly for positive values of α. The DWL 
decreases with α, reflecting that the bundle’s output moves closer toward the efficient level 
as α increases. However observe that, as Y increases with α, the DWL associated with those 
customers purchasing unbundled output also increases with α. This, to some extent, offset the 
effect of increasing bundle size. 
 
The size of the DWL could be underestimated in the unbundling market is informal in the 
way discussed in the introduction. In this event an investigator may not observe the resale 
market, and thus interpret L as the total number of customers. The DWL is assumed to arise 
because the bundle size is less than XE. The DWL would therefore be incorrectly measured as 
DI≡L{B(XE)-cXE-[B(Z)-cZ]}. The value of this incorrectly measured DWL, DI, is reported 
in table 1. It can be seen that the difference between the actual DWL and DI rises with α. 
When α=1 the incorrectly measured DWL is less than half the true DWL. Also reported in 
table 1 is the value of DI/BI ≡ 1-[B(Z)-cZ]/[B(XE)-cXE]. This figure represents an estimate of 
the DWL as a fraction of the maximum total surplus, based on the incorrect assumption that 
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the total number of customers is L and not N (i.e. overlooking the resale market). It can be 
seen that this measure underestimates the efficiency loss, particularly for high values of α.  
 
3. Endogenous unbundling cost 
 
There are some products for which the firm may be able to influence the cost of 
unbundling.15 The model considered in section 1 is now extended to allow the firm some 
scope to influence the cost of resale. Suppose the cost of resale is αM, and that the firm can 
ensure a particular marginal unbundling cost of α, through an expenditure of ςα. The marginal 
cost of influencing resale, ς, is exogenous to the firm. In this case equation (3) would be 
recast as: 
 
π(Z,Y,a) = L(Z,Y,α)Π(Z,Y,α) =  ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞N-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z-Y
Y M(Z,Y,α) (R(Z,Y) +P(Z)Z-cZ- ςα) (8) 
 
where from (1): 
 
                                                 
15 A recent dramatic case of unbundling, albeit with respect to the bundling of complementary rather than 
homogeneous goods, involved the unlocking of cell phones provided by TracFone. TracFone provided cheap 
cell phones which were locked to their network. The intention was that customers would purchase the phones, 
then pay a relatively high rate for calls. However traders purchased these phones from retail outlets and then 
unlocked them. The unlocked phones could be resold at a significant mark-up. See: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25665617/ns/technology_and_science-wireless/#storyContinued 
TracFone launched extensive (and thus costly) legal action to try to prevent the firms which were unbundling 
their output from conducting this arbitrage. Interestingly, while the unlocking (unbundling) is not in itself 
illegal, both terrorism laws and copyright/patent laws (i.e. laws not intended to restrict legal arbitrage) ere used 
in an attempt to curtail the unbundling.  
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M(Z,Y,α) ≡ [(P(Y)-P(Z))Z – R(Z,Y)]/α   (9) 
 
The conditions for the optimal bundle, (4), (5) and (2), are unaffected by this modification 
and the optimal level of α is given by: 
 
ELα ≡ ςα/Π     (10) 
 
where ELα ≡ αLα/L =(Z-Y)M/YL>0. That is, the firm chooses the cost of resale so that the 
elasticity of bundles sold with respect to cost of resale is equal to the share of profit required 
to achieve that level of resale. In this extension it is to be expected that α will be higher for 
those products for which the marginal unbundling cost is sensitive to the firms’ efforts to 
increase it. 
 
Again, the most instructive method to further analyse the impact of a change in ς on the 
equilibrium of the model is to consider modifications to numerical example above. In 
particular the numerical model is modified so that the objective function is (8).  In this event 
the profit maximising values of Z, R, Y and α vary with ς. Some simulations of the model are 
given in table 2. It can be seen from Table 2 that as ς falls, the equilibrium value of  α 
increases.  
 
Where comparable, the qualitative conclusions from the analysis in section 2 remain 
unchanged. This is unsurprising as conditions (4) and (5) have not been affected by the 
extension of the model. Table 2 reports total expenditure on discouraging unbundling, ςα. 
This has an inverse U-shape with respect to ς, reaching a maximum for reported values when 
ς=2.15 (or α=1). Total expenditure on discouraging unbundling a type of rent seeking 
activity, and is thus an additional component to deadweight loss. This expenditure increases 
deadweight loss, particularly for intermediate values. However as the relative magnitude of 
ςα in this numerical model is not that great, the increase in DWL due to the inclusion of this 
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rent seeking activity is not that great. However this need not be the case in general, and high 
efficiency losses resulting from expenditures on discouraging unbundling (as described by 
footnote 13) is possible.  
  
 18
4. Discussion 
 
This paper has presented a parsimonious model of non-linear pricing in the presence of 
unbundling.   The conditions for profit maximising bundle size and fee were found.  It is 
shown that the bundles offered by the producer are smaller than the optimal. Consumers are 
endogenously divided into those who purchase bundled and unbundled output. In equilibrium 
consumers obtain positive consumer surplus (whether they purchases bundled or unbundled 
output).  It is also shown that consumers who purchase unbundled output purchase less output 
than is in the bundle. As all customers are assumed identical, these results are not the result of 
price discrimination, but can be attributed entirely to the use of non-linear pricing when some 
unbundling is possible.  
 
The impact of changes in the cost of unbundling are investigated using a numerical model. 
The cost of unbundling would be expected to vary from market to market. When unbundling 
is costless, the firm is indifferent between linear pricing and non-linear pricing. However the 
firm adopts non-linear pricing even for small resale cost. In this event the numerical model 
suggests that a considerable amount of unbundling is encouraged.  
 
The numerical analysis indicates that the size of the bundle, the price of the bundle, and the 
deadweight loss are monotonically increasing with respect to the cost of unbundling. 
However the number of bundles sold is not monotonic with respect to the cost of unbundling. 
Importantly, in the numerical model, the number of bundles sold for moderate values of the 
cost of unbundling, is lower than for extreme values. When the unbundling market is 
informal, this possibility may not be recognised. This could lead to an under estimate of the 
number of customers of a product and thus the misspecification of demand. Similarly, the 
efficiency loss in a market would be underestimated if the customers purchasing unbundled 
output are not considered by investigators.  
 
The price per unit is also not monotonic with respect to unbundling cost. Some studies (e.g. 
Nevo, 2001) use price per unit to approximate a linear price for the purpose of econometric 
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estimation. This procedure could result in misspecification biases if conducted across 
industries which vary in the level of unbundling cost, if this variation is not accounted for. 
Furthermore, in the presence of non-linear pricing with unbundling, the ‘mark-up’ of price 
per unit over marginal cost cannot be used as a measure of market performance. As is 
indicated by Table 1, those industries with the highest price per unit are those with 
intermediate levels of unbundling cost, and hence intermediate values of DWL. 
 
This analysis can be used to investigate the pricing effects of the unintended consequence of 
some types of legislation. Legislation may have predictable and intended effects; for example 
food safety laws may solve an adverse selection problem regarding food quality and safety, 
and thus raise demand.  However, in addition to the benefit or cost of the legislation, the 
impact on pricing may also be important. To the extent that legislation raises the cost of 
unbundling, its effect is to raise profits and efficiency, and lower consumer surplus.   
 
In some markets firms may be able to take actions that discourage unbundling. The effect of 
this on efficiency is twofold. Restricting unbundling promotes efficiency. However the 
actions taken to discourage unbundling is a type of rent seeking activity. The cost of this 
action reduces economic efficiency. The overall impact on economic efficiency depends on 
which of these two effects dominates. In the numerical calculations conduced in section 3 the 
former effect overwhelmingly dominated, so that the actions to restrict unbundling were 
efficient.  
 
The obvious strategy for the firm to adopt to discourage unbundling is to write contracts with 
its customers that prohibits unbundling. Such contracts may be viewed as a form of vertical 
restraint, and thus raise a competition/antitrust law issue.  In general, the extent to which 
vertical restraints are in the social interest is controversial. It is shown in this paper that, 
because the resale market is a constraint on achieving efficiency, contracts that prohibit resale 
are a type of vertical restraint that promotes efficiency. On the other had this type of vertical 
restraint does restrict competition (specifically in the resale market) and reduces consumer 
surplus. As is commonly noted competition/antitrust laws are often primarily directed at 
promoting competition and consumer interests, with economic efficiency as a secondary goal. 
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To the extent that this philosophy caused a ban on contracts prohibiting resale, it would be 
misconceived. Intuitively, it would seem better to promote competition between 
manufactures rather than resellers. However this remains to be demonstrated in future work.     
 
The analysis in this paper was greatly simplified by the assumption that all customers are 
identical; this approach has the additional benefit that the impact of unbundling on non-linear 
pricing is considered in isolation from price discrimination. Of course, customer 
heterogeneity is ubiquitous, and accounting for this is important in many investigations. 
When customers differ the firm has an incentive to engage in both price discrimination and 
non-linear pricing. Sibly (2009) discusses unbundling with heterogeneous customers in the 
case in which customers purchase a small number of discrete units. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
As R≥0, by (2) Z≥Y. The Lagrangian for the firm’s optimisation problem is: 
 
L(Z,Y)= ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞N-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z-Y
Y M(Z,Y) (R(Z,Y) +P(Z)Z-cZ)+λ[Z-Y]   (A1) 
 
where λ≥0 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition of (3), LZ(Z,Y) = 0, yields: 
 
LZ(Z,Y)= -[M/Y+(Z-Y)MZ/Y]Π(Z,Y)+ L(Z,Y)[RZ+P′(Z)Z+P(Z)-c]+λ = 0  (A2) 
 
The first order condition of (3), LY(Z,Y) = 0, yields: 
 
LY(Z,Y)= [ZM/Y2-(Z-Y)MY/Y]Π(Z,Y)+ L(Z,Y)RY-λ = 0   (A3) 
 
where from (2): 
 
RZ = -P′(Z)Z 
and  
RY =  +P′(Y)Y 
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and from (1): 
 
MZ = {[P(Y) - P(Z) - P′(Z)Z] - RZ}/g′(M)  = [P(Y) - P(Z)]/g′(M) ≥ 0 
 
and 
MY = {P′(Y)Z - RY}/g′(M)  = P′(Y)[Z-Y]/g′(M) ≤  0 
 
Hence (A2) becomes: 
 
LZ(Z,Y)= -[M/Y+(Z-Y)MZ/Y]Π(Z,Y)+ L(Z,Y)[P(Z)-c]+λ  (A4)  
 
and (A3) becomes: 
 
LY(Z,Y)= [ZM/Y2 - (Z-Y)MY/Y]Π(Z,Y)+ L(Z,Y)P′(Y)Y-λ = 0 (A5)  
 
First it is shown that Z>Y. This is done by contradiction. Suppose that Z=Y. In this case λ>0. 
Further from (A4)  
LZ(Z,Y)=  N[P(Z)-c]+λ > 0 ≠ 0 
and  
LY(Z,Y)= NP′(Z)Z-λ < 0 ≠ 0. 
 
Hence Z=Y cannot be an equilibrium. 
 
 23
Equations (4) and (4) follow from (A4) and (A5) respectively. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
The Lagrangian is: 
L(Z,R,Y)=  ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞N-⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z
Y M(Z,Y) (B(Z)-cZ) + ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Z
Y M(Z,Y)(B(Y)-cY) –G(M) 
+ μ(L(Z,Y)(R(Z,Y)+P(Z)Z-cZ)-F)    (A6) 
where μ≥0 is the  Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian may be rewritten:  
L(Z,R,Y)= (1+μ)L(Z,Y)(R(Z,Y)+P(Z)Z-cZ)+N[B(Y)-YP(Y)]+Mg(M) 
–G(M)- μF 
= (1+μ)π(Z,R) +N[B(Y)-YP(Y)]+Mg(M) –G(M)- μF (A7) 
where (1) and (2) has been substituted in the rearrangement. The first order condition of (A7), 
LZ(Z,Y) = 0, yields: 
 
(1+μ){πZ(Z,R)}+Mg′(M)MZ= 0    (A8) 
 
Hence the efficient bundle satisfies: 
πZ(Z,Y) = -M[P(Y)-P(Z)]/(1+μ) < 0.     (A9) 
 
The first order condition of (A6), LY(Z,Y) = 0, and (A7) yields: 
 
LY(Z,R,Y) = (1+μ)πY(Z,Y)-NYP′(Y)+Mg′(M)MY =0 
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Thus the efficient bundle satisfies: 
πY(Z,Y) = [NYP′(Y) - Mg′(M)MY]/(1+μ)  
= YP′(Y)L/(1+μ) < 0  (A10) 
 
From (A9) and (A10) the efficient bundle must satisfy: 
 
πZ(Z,Y)
πY(Z,Y)   = 
-M[P(Y)-P(Z)]
YP′(Y)L   > 0   (A11) 
 
When μ>0 the efficient bundle solves the (A11) and (7). 
From (A2): 
πZY(Z,Y) = -[MY/Y-M/Y2-ZMZ/Y2+(Z-Y)MZY/Y]Π(Z,Y) 
-[M/Y+(Z-Y)MZ/Y]RY(Z,Y)+ [ZM/Y2-(Z-Y)MY/Y][P(Z)-c] > 0 
as MZY=P′(Y)/g′(M) < 0. Then the slope for the curve πZ(Z,Y)=0 is given by: 
 
⎪⎪
⎪dY
dZ πZ(Z,Y)=0 = 
-πZZ(Z,Y)
πZY(Z,Y)   > 0 
 
Hence the curve πZ(Z,Y)=0 is upward sloping. Similarly the slope of the curve πY(Z,Y)=0 is 
given by: 
 
⎪⎪
⎪dY
dZ πY(Z,Y)=0 = 
-πYY(Z,Y)
πZY(Z,Y)   > 0 
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so the curve is also upward sloping. The second order conditions require that πZ(Z,Y)=0 is 
steeper than πY(Z,Y)=0. These curves are shown in figure A1.  
 
As πZZ(Z,Y)<0, from (A9) the efficient bundle must lie below the πZ(Z,Y)=0 curve. Similarly 
as πYY(Z,Y)<0, from (A10) the efficient bundle must lie above the πY(Z,Y)=0 curve. 
Consequently the efficient bundle must lie in the region identified as πZ(Z,Y)<0 πY(Z,Y)< 0 
in figure A1. As a result the efficient values of Z and Y must lie above the equilibrium values 
of Z and Y. || 
 
Proof of proposition 3:  
(a) For sufficiently small α (1) gives 
P(Y)Z – [R + P(Z)Z] ≈ αZM ≈ 0  
or R+P(Z)Z≈P(Y)Z. As α→0, (2) gives: 
B(Z)-P(Y)Z ≈ B(Y)-P(Y)Y 
or X ≈Y and R≈0. In this case L ≈ N, and hence: 
L(Z,T,Y) ≈ N(P(Z)Z-cZ) 
The optimal value of Z is thus Z=XM. 
(b)  For sufficiently large α (1) gives M≈0 and hence L(Z,T,Y) ≈ N.   
L(Z,T,Y) ≈ N(R(Z,Y)+P(Z)-cZ)  
Then:   
LY(Z,T,Y) ≈ NYP′(Y) <0. 
Hence Y≈0.  Further LZ(Z,T,Y) = 0 yields: 
P(Z) ≈ cλ  
Hence Z=XE. Thus (2) implies T=B(XE).   
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(c) By the envelope theorem: 
∂π/∂α= Π(∂L/∂α)= ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Y-Z
Y ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞∂M
∂α   >0 
 
 
  
 27
 
 
 
  
 28
 
Table 1 
α 10-08 10-06 10-04 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 104 105
Z 4.001 4.005 4.053 4.446 5.078 6.114 7.171 7.747 7.937 7.986 7.997
Y 4 3.997 3.973 3.767 3.402 2.687 1.711 0.896 0.43 0.201 0.094
R 0.003 0.033 0.32 2.786 7.108 15.08 24.25 29.61 31.41 31.86 31.97
M 30.60 33.13 31.84 23.02 14.05 5.872 1.491 0.235 0.028 0.003 0.0003 
Π 16.00 16.03 16.32 18.59 21.95 26.61 30.19 31.57 31.91 31.98 32.00
L 99.99 99.93 99.36 95.86 93.08 92.51 95.24 98.21 99.51 99.88 99.97
π 1600 1600 1620 1780 2040 2460 2880 3100 3180 3190 3200
T 24.00 24.04 24.42 27.47 32.10 38.84 44.54 47.06 47.78 47.95 47.99
T/Z 6 6.003 6.026 6.181 6.322 6.352 6.21 6.074 6.02 6.005 6.001
P(Y) 6 6.003 6.027 6.233 6.599 7.312 8.289 9.103 9.57 9.799 9.906
CS 7.999 7.989 7.894 7.097 5.786 3.610 1.463 0.402 0.093 0.020 0.004
DWL 799.9 798.9 789.2 703.3 559.1 342.6 155.8 54.32 15.10 3.669 0.835
DI 799.8 797.3 773.9 605.4 397.3 164.5 32.71 3.131 0.198 0.01 0.0005 
D/B* 25.00 24.97 24.66 21.98 17.47 10.71 4.869 1.698 0.472 0.115 0.026
DI/BI 24.99 24.93 24.34 19.74 13.34 5.556 1.073 0.100 0.006 0.000 0.000
 
  
 29
Table 2
ς 1053.00  82.00  16.60 2.15 0.15 0.01 0.0002 
α 10‐4  0.01  0.1  1 10 100 1000 
Z 4.05  4.34  5.11 6.15 7.19 7.75 7.94 
Y 3.97  3.76  3.39 2.66 1.69 0.89 0.43 
R 0.32  2.33  7.30 15.40 24.41 29.63 31.41 
M 32.03  16.36  14.79 6.11 1.51 0.24 0.03 
Π 16.21  17.39  20.42  24.61  28.76  31.00  31.75 
L 99.36  97.50  92.49 91.96 95.08 98.19 99.51 
π 1611.00  1695.00  1889.00  2263.00  2734.00  3044.00  3159.00 
T 24.43  26.89  32.29 39.07 44.62 47.07 47.78 
T/Z 6.03  6.20  6.33 6.35 6.21 6.07 6.02 
P(Y) 6.03  6.24  6.61 7.34 8.31 9.11 9.55 
CS 7.89  7.08  5.73 3.53 1.43 0.40 0.09 
ας 0.105  0.820  1.660 2.152 1.490 0.572 0.157 
DWL 789.36  713.91  564.76 350.56 160.21 55.31 15.29 
DI 773.81  653.50  387.55 156.84 31.28 3.07 0.20 
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